This monograph is the product of research undertaken by Becker in preparation for a commentary on Philippians. So, while it covers a wide swath in Paul and the Christian tradition, the work focuses on humility as developed in Philippians. Chapter 1 lays out the basic claims of the book and attempts to recognize the numerous possible pitfalls that arise in understanding the Pauline concept of humility. The chapter begins with the claim, well-substantiated throughout the book, that Paul coined the term ταπεινοϕροσύνη in Phil 2:3, commonly translated as “humility” (Demut), but throughout the monograph translated as “low-disposition” (Neidrig-Gesinnung). Becker argues this term is not only unattested in ancient Greek literature, but conceptually alien to both Hellenistic and Roman ethics. She also asserts that in this term we find “nothing less than a fundamental theme of Christian theology” (p. 2).But to get at Paul’s understanding of humility we will need to cut through the weeds of two millennia of reception history. Becker begins with the place of Christian moral discourse in the “cultural-historical memory” of contemporary European political life. The Christian moral discourse was, at an early stage, centered around a system of moral virtues that invariably shapes our understanding of humility. Becker treads carefully here, wanting to recognize where Paul actually engages with ancient Hellenistic philosophical ethics but also to distinguish it from where we might be in danger of imposing a system alien to Paul. As she says, “The theological engagement with the doctrine of virtue and vices . . . goes beyond the question of motif or tradition-historical derivation and spills over into the sphere of hermeneutics” (p. 13). While Becker has designated some of her ambivalences toward taking humility as a “virtue,” she concludes the chapter with an initial pair of categories for understanding Paul’s term ταπεινοϕροσύνη, which she describes as both a virtue and an ethos. That is, it denotes a moral disposition that requires moral action in consort with that disposition, but it also describes something essential to community ethos. This is a helpful pairing that moves us forward in understanding Paul. It is miles ahead of the majority of Pauline scholars for whom “humility” becomes another doctrine to fit within his theology. For Becker “humility” marks a mature development in Paul’s ecclesial thought, while also remaining an ethical norm.Chapter 2 is mostly taken up with a Forschungsbericht on “humility” in Christian theology and Pauline studies. At the heart of this history is a deep ambivalence. “From ancient to modern Christianity, there has been controversy over the extent to which humility is a specific characteristic or unique feature or whether it must be understood in analogy to or in distinction from ancient philosophy and teaching on virtue” (p. 40). One side of this debate Becker sees rooted in Clement and especially Augustine, for whom humility is “the foundation of all (Christian) virtues.” This tradition sees humility as the principal virtue that distinguishes it from Hellenistic and Roman understandings of virtue. Barth, Bonhoeffer, and Schrage are the primary modern exemplars of this tradition. The other side of the tradition views humility as either a vice (Nietzche) or simply another element to be assimilated into a modern understanding of Hellenistic ethics. In Pauline studies this primarily translates into those that see Paul through a Stoic lens (e.g., Jewett and Engberg-Pedersen).Chapter 3 turns to detailed exegesis of Phil 2 viewed through various lenses. Becker roots Paul’s call to “low-disposition” in the theology of the Hebrew Bible (and LXX), where God sees and exalts the low, the poor, the rejected, and the humble. “Paul builds on Israel’s religious conception of lowliness and advances—in contacts with the so-called pagan outside world—the program of a productive and consistent ‘reversal of all values.’ In this way ταπεινοϕροσύνη becomes the leading ethical term (Leitbegriff) in the community” (p. 58).Becker substantiates this distinctive “reversal of values” in demonstrating the contempt of Greco-Roman authors for ταπεινός and its cognates. Aristotle, Epictetus, and Philo all exemplify this tradition. Surprisingly, even Josephus joins in condemning the lowly as “shabby” and morally lazy. Paul’s prioritization of ταπεινοϕροσύνη as a central virtue stands outside of and at odds with this tradition. Again, Becker sees ταπεινοϕροσύνη as both an individual virtue and a communal ethos, or more specifically an ecclesial ethos. She finds support for the latter in the political philosophy of Plato in his Leg. 715e–716a. There is certainly something to be said for the idea that Paul imagines the ecclesia as an alternative or counter-polis; the πολιτεύεσθε of Phil 1:27 is enough evidence of that. But I find the support from this text in Plato as insufficient to argue that Paul is “close” to “the political and philosophical reflections of Plato on the realization of a community oriented toward justice” (p. 65). While I have some sympathy with the assertion, the textual connection is too thin.Becker quickly brushes aside those who stand in interpretive tradition of Käsemann, along with those who see the prehistory of the Christ hymn as the key to its interpretation. Rather she focuses on the question of how Christ serves as an exemplar of ταπεινοϕροσύνη. She summarizes this in the four actions of: renunciation of attributes/rights, change of form, self-lowering, and obedience. Critically, these four actions are not themselves a prescription for imitation, but actions that enact a certain phronesis (practical wisdom), which is the true target of imitation. Becker places this Christian phronesis amidst Aristotelian and Hellenistic employments of the same concept.Chapter 4 explores humility in Rom. and 2 Cor. and seeks to develop a possible trajectory of Paul’s thought on the subject. First, Becker focuses on Paul himself and his self-designation as a δοῦλος Χριστοῦ, through which Paul embraces and promotes the ethic of “low-disposition.” “Paul uses the role of as a metaphor that is assigned to different actors and personal relations. It serves the description of the activity of Christ (Phil 2.7b), the relation of the apostle to Christ, and the apostle’s relation to the community” (p. 91). Becker sees humility as the key to understanding Paul’s paraenesis in both Rom 12–14 and 2 Cor 10–13. Romans 12 explicitly connects it to a Christian phronesis. Through this Becker sees something of a trajectory in Paul’s thought, where humility moves from its application in specific ethical situation in 2 Corinthians, toward becoming a communal ethos in Phil 2.Chapter 5 is the theological heart of the book and focuses on the connection Paul makes in Phil 2 between humility and phronesis. Becker’s gift for synthetic analysis, combining exegetical sensitivity with theological discernment, shines here. The key question is how and to what extent is Paul placing himself within the Hellenistic philosophical traditions, rooted in Aristotle, that sees phronesis as a habituated intellectual virtue, essential to moral formation.Becker argues that Paul consciously develops a specifically Christian phronesis (means of discernment) that has its roots in the Aristotelian tradition, but is also distinguishable from that tradition and especially its development in Stoicism. This Stoic tradition finds a resonance with contemporary biblical scholars who reduce humility to the realm of moral virtue. Becker sees this as a reduction to the point of distortion. Humility is 1) a moral virtue but also 2) a communal ethos and 3) the heart of a distinctly Christian phronesis and thus an intellectual, “dianoetic,” virtue. The communal ethos of humility is not defined by self-negation but by a love that directs itself consciously away from oneself in seeking the good of others in the community. Becker finds support for this in Bultmann’s definition of humility as “a ‘special manifestation’ of ἀγάπη.” Humility as a way of being is also generative of moral direction and insight. As Becker says, “[T]he practice of ταπεινοϕροσύνη not only falls within the sphere of ethical virtues but in equal measure promotes insight, wisdom, and understanding in mutual interaction. Here we once again touch upon a fundamental idea in the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, where this is to be reckoned among the dianoetic virtues” (p. 112).These are invaluable insights that get us much closer to Paul’s understanding of ταπεινοϕροσύνη within his historical environment. All the Hellenistic schools focused on developing a distinctive phronesis. While they all saw phronesis as essentially the same skill, each defined their distinct version of phronesis through a small cluster of key virtues. While we often see similar “virtue lists” amongst these groups, what distinguishes them is the handful of essential virtues that defines the ethos of that group. (For example, the Stoic virtue of apatheia.) This is exactly what Becker is putting her finger on when she sees Paul defining a Christian phronesis centered on humility.Finally, although she doesn’t use explicitly teleological language, Becker does deliberate on what goal humility serves. While she often seems to follow the common misconception in NT studies that the community itself is a self-sufficient goal, to be sought for it’s own sake, she ultimately finds this dissatisfying. She rightly points to χάρα as the summum bonum in Philippians, as an eschatological participation in the joy and glory of God. “The ecclesia that is oriented to Christ is only an anticipation of and witness to the fellowship with God, which must be expected beyond every political ordering” (pp. 114–15).Chapter 6 focuses on the reception and utilization of humility in the rest of the NT and patristics. Matthew and Luke build on the LXX association of humility with poverty and lack of social status. “Matthew paradigmatically binds humility to the person of Jesus” (p. 127). But Becker sees this as instrumental in the “humility of Jesus” becoming a list of prescribed character traits, and thus a more concrete but less sophisticated than Paul’s. “In the process, an ethical concentration takes place, which ultimately falls short of Philippians conceptually” (p. 139). She sees the same reductive movement in the deutero-Pauline and catholic epistles. Becker notes the same movement in the patristics, where humility language is most prominent in the Shepherd of Hermas and 1 Clement.The final chapter is a combination of Wirkungsgeschichte, summary, and application. Chrysostom is given high marks as “the most important patristic interpreter of Philippians” (p. 142). She applauds his understanding of humility because it moves beyond morality. “Like Paul he connects ecclesiological, ethical, and christological questions” (p. 143). The two twentieth century scholars lauded for their appropriation of Paul are Ernst Lohmeyer and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Like Chrysostom their discussions of humility are animated by Christological and ecclesial concerns.In summary, Becker describes ταπεινοϕροσύνη as both “a central term in Pauline thought” and “the ultima ratio of a community-ethical principle” (p. 147). In contrast to the Christian tradition which she sees as largely reducing humility to an ethical duty, Becker argues for humility as constituting the foundation for a distinctly Christian phronesis, an ethos that generates practical wisdom for the flourishing of love in the Christian community as it imitates Christ. This is a theologically and ecclesiologically rich understanding that recovers something central to Paul’s thought and fruitful for the contemporary church. This is an invaluable contribution to Pauline studies.